Chapter 1: Europe at a crossroads – The situation at the time of Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment

When Ursula von der Leyen took over the presidency of the European Commission on 1 December 2019, the European Union was in a delicate and complex transition phase. After years of interconnected crises – from the post-2008 economic recession to the management of migration flows, up to Brexit – the EU was a fragmented entity, grappling with internal and external challenges that tested its cohesion and its ability to act as a global player.

The appointment of von der Leyen, the first woman to hold this role, took place in a context of profound uncertainty, with a Europe divided between sovereignist pressures and integration ambitions, between social crises and geopolitical pressures.

Let’s see what the European situation was at the time of her appointment, analyzing the main areas: political, social, diplomatic, commercial and industrial.

The political situation: a fragmented and polarized Europe

On the political level, Europe in 2019 was marked by growing polarization. The European elections in May had highlighted the strengthening of populist and nationalist parties, such as the Lega in Italy, the Rassemblement National in France and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, which were calling into question the traditional European project. At the same time, the pro-European parties – the People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists (S&D) and the Liberals (ALDE/Renew Europe) – maintained a fragile majority in the European Parliament, but were forced to deal with a loss of consensus among citizens. The nomination of von der Leyen, proposed by the European Council after a difficult negotiation, broke with the practice of the “Spitzenkandidat”, the system that provided for the choice of the President of the Commission based on the election results. This decision, mainly desired by Emmanuel Macron and reluctantly accepted by Angela Merkel, was perceived as a sign of distrust towards the European Parliament, fuelling criticism of the democratic nature of the process.
Within the member states, tensions were palpable. Italy, governed by an unstable coalition between the Five Star Movement and the League until August 2019, and subsequently by a new alliance between the M5S and the Democratic Party, was at odds with Brussels on economic and migration issues. Poland and Hungary, led respectively by Law and Justice (PiS) and Fidesz, were openly challenging the democratic values ​​of the EU, with violations of the rule of law that would have led to procedures under Article 7 of the EU Treaty. In the United Kingdom, Brexit was imminent: on 31 January 2020, London would leave the Union, putting an end to a process that began with the 2016 referendum and raising questions about the future of relations between the EU and the United Kingdom. In this context, von der Leyen found herself inheriting a politically unstable Europe, with a precarious balance between Member States and community institutions.

The social situation: inequalities and discontent

From a social point of view, Europe in 2019 was marked by deep inequalities and a growing sense of insecurity among citizens. The economic crisis of 2008 had left deep scars, especially in Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy, where youth unemployment reached alarming levels (in Greece it exceeded 40%, in Spain 32%). The austerity policies imposed by the Troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF) had fueled widespread resentment towards Brussels, perceived as distant and technocratic. In Western European countries, such as France and Germany, protest movements – from the Gilets Jaunes to demonstrations against pension reforms – signalled a rift between elites and popular classes. The migration issue remained a raw nerve. After the peak of the 2015-2016 crisis, with over a million refugees arriving mainly via the Balkan and Mediterranean routes, the EU had failed to reform the asylum system, leaving countries such as Italy and Greece to manage the flows on their own. Solidarity between member states was fragile, with the Visegrád group countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) rejecting any mechanism for redistributing migrants. This fuelled internal social tensions, with the rise of xenophobic rhetoric and the strengthening of far-right parties. At the same time, Europe was facing a demographic crisis: an ageing population and declining birth rates posed long-term challenges for pension and healthcare systems, while immigration, while necessary, remained a politically divisive issue.

The diplomatic situation: a Europe in search of autonomy

On the diplomatic level, the EU was in a vulnerable position. The transatlantic relationship, a historic pillar of European security, had been called into question by the administration of Donald Trump, who took office in 2017. The United States was increasingly disengaged from Europe, criticizing NATO and pursuing an “America First” foreign policy. This prompted some leaders, such as Macron, to call for greater “strategic autonomy” for the EU, but the project of a common defense remained embryonic, hampered by internal divisions and dependence on Washington. In the East, Russia posed a constant threat. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in Donbass had cooled relations between Moscow and Brussels, with economic sanctions weighing on both sides. Meanwhile, China was emerging as a global power, with the New Silk Road project seeking to penetrate Europe economically, raising concerns about its dependence on Beijing in strategic sectors such as infrastructure and technology (e.g. Huawei’s 5G). Brexit also deprived the EU of an influential voice in the diplomatic and military spheres, making the need for a common foreign policy more urgent. Von der Leyen therefore took office at a time when Europe had to redefine its global role, between leadership ambitions and risks of marginalization.

The trade situation: between protectionism and global competition

From a trade perspective, Europe in 2019 was an economic giant – the world’s second-largest market after the United States – but it faced significant challenges. Intra-EU trade accounted for 64% of total trade, but the bloc was exposed to an increasingly protectionist world. The Trump administration had imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum in 2018, threatening further escalations, while negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade Agreement (TTIP) were stalled. With China, relations were ambivalent: Beijing was a key trading partner (the EU’s second-largest export market), but also a competitor accused of unfair practices, such as dumping and state subsidies.
Brexit further complicated the scenario. The United Kingdom, one of the EU’s main trading partners, was preparing to leave the single market and customs union, creating uncertainty for European businesses. Meanwhile, the EU was trying to strengthen its economic resilience through agreements with Japan (entered into force in 2019) and Mercosur (under negotiation), but dependence on non-EU raw materials and technologies – such as Asian semiconductors – highlighted structural vulnerabilities. In this context, von der Leyen proposed the “Green Deal” as a lever to combine trade and sustainability, but the project required massive investments and a transition that many feared would penalize traditional industries.

The industrial situation: decline and transition
European industry, which contributed 16% of EU GDP and employed around 32 million people, was in relative decline. Over the past decades, relocation to low-wage countries, especially in Asia, had eroded the manufacturing base, with around 3.8 million jobs lost between 2008 and 2013. Although there was a slight recovery (1.5 million new jobs since 2013), the EU was losing competitiveness compared to China and the United States. The global market share of European exports fell from 16.4% in 2006 to 15.7% in 2016, while China rose from 11% to 17%.
Key sectors such as automotive, aeronautics and chemicals remained world leaders, but were under pressure from the transition to decarbonisation. Germany, the EU’s industrial locomotive, was dealing with “Dieselgate” and the need to convert its car industry to electric, while countries like Italy were complaining about a chronic lack of investment in innovation. Dependence on foreign technologies – from semiconductors to solar panels – was a sticking point, accentuated by competition with China, a leader in the production of green technologies. Europe was thus at a crossroads: relaunch its industrial base or risk irreversible decline.

Conclusion: a complex legacy for von der Leyen
On the eve of Ursula von der Leyen’s mandate, Europe was a mosaic of contradictions: an ambitious but fragmented political project, a restless and unequal society, a diplomatic actor seeking autonomy, a vulnerable commercial giant and an industry in transition. The new president found herself having to face epochal challenges – the COVID-19 pandemic would explode a few weeks after her inauguration – with a Union already weakened by years of crisis. Her program, centered on the Green Deal, strategic autonomy and equality, promised a turning point. But the starting context raised an unavoidable question: would she succeed in uniting Europe or would she end up accelerating its divisions?

Chapter 2: EU Decisions That Accelerated Economic and Diplomatic Decline

Introduction: A Europe in Crisis
The European Union, born as a project of peace and prosperity, has found itself facing a series of crises that have undermined its economic stability and international credibility. The decisions taken in recent years, often driven by a rigid ideology and a hostile approach towards key players such as Donald Trump, have contributed to an economic collapse, growing social polarization and a deterioration of international relations. This chapter analyses the EU’s most controversial choices, their negative consequences and the role of antagonism towards Trump in worsening the situation, highlighting how the inability to listen to citizens’ discontent, culminating in Brexit, has been aggravated under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen.

Economic, Social Decisions and Negative Consequences

The EU has adopted a series of policies that, although motivated by idealistic objectives, have had a devastating impact on the European economy and social cohesion.
1. Green Transition and Green Deal
The European Green Deal, launched in 2019, aimed to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. However, the accelerated implementation of these policies has had disastrous economic consequences:

• Rising energy costs: The rapid phasing out of fossil fuels, without adequate alternatives, has made the EU vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy prices, affecting households and industries.
• Deindustrialization: Strict environmental regulations have forced many energy-intensive industries, such as steel and chemicals, to relocate to countries with less stringent regulations, such as China or India. This has led to job losses and a weakening of Europe’s industrial fabric.
• Lack of competitiveness: The EU has failed to balance the green transition with economic competitiveness, leaving its companies at a disadvantage compared to those in the United States and China, which have adopted more pragmatic approaches.

2. COVID-19 Management: Vaccine Costs, Reimbursement Scattering and Consequences
The EU’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic under President Ursula von der Leyen has had a significant economic and social impact, with decisions generating high costs and long-term consequences:

• Exorbitant vaccine costs: The EU has invested heavily in vaccine procurement, with a 2.4 billion dose contract negotiated with Pfizer-BioNTech and other pharmaceutical companies. However, the centralised management of procurement has been criticised for a lack of transparency and inflated prices: the EU is estimated to have spent over €71 billion on vaccines, with millions of unused doses having been destroyed or donated due to overestimation of needs.
• Refunds to entrepreneurs: To mitigate the economic impact of the restrictions, the EU and individual member states have provided massive aid in the form of grants, loans and reimbursements, often without rigorous criteria. In Italy, for example, the “Cura Italia” program distributed billions of euros to businesses and self-employed workers, but limited controls led to widespread fraud: at least 10% of the funds were paid to ineligible beneficiaries, according to a 2023 European Court of Auditors report.
• Economic and social consequences: The management of COVID-19 has increased public debt (which reached 95% of the average GDP in the euro area in 2022), limiting the ability of states to invest in strategic sectors. Socially, inequalities have increased: lockdowns have hit precarious workers and small businesses hard, while large companies have prospered. Prolonged school closures have caused an increase in the educational gap, with an estimated impact of 0.5 years of lost learning for European students, according to a 2023 OECD study.

3. Rising Inflation: An Unprecedented Phenomenon with the Euro
Under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the EU has faced a phenomenon never seen since the introduction of the euro: galloping inflation that has reached dangerous levels. Before 2019, during the presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU’s main economic problem was deflation, with inflation rates often below the European Central Bank’s (ECB) target of 2%. However, since 2021, the situation has changed dramatically:

• Record inflation: Inflation in the euro area reached 10.6% in October 2022, a level never seen since the introduction of the single currency, driven by rising energy prices and bottlenecks in global supply chains, exacerbated by the pandemic. In 2023, inflation has remained high, fluctuating between 5% and 7%.
• Erosion of purchasing power: This increase in prices has hit European families hard, with an increase in the cost of living that has reduced purchasing power, especially for the lower and middle classes, fueling social protests in countries such as France and Italy.
• Absence of effective solutions: The ECB has increased interest rates to 4% by 2023, but this has slowed economic growth without taming inflation. As of March 2025, there is still no clear strategy in sight to mitigate the problem.
• Austerity Policies and Lack of Investment: Despite the crises, the EU has maintained a rigid approach to budgetary matters, with some member states pushing for a return to austerity rules (such as the Stability and Growth Pact) after the pandemic. This has had negative effects: Reduced public investment: Public spending cuts have limited investment in infrastructure, innovation and digitalisation, making the EU less competitive compared to the US and China. Internal inequalities: Southern European countries, such as Italy and Greece, already burdened by high public debts, have seen their economic conditions worsen further, fuelling resentment towards Brussels.

4. Social and Cultural Policies: Rainbow Glorification, Insect Flours and Migrant Management
The social and cultural policies promoted by the EU under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen have generated a wave of aversion and polarization, contributing to growing discontent among European citizens:

• Rainbow Glorification and Limitation of LGBT Propaganda: The EU has pushed for strong promotion of LGBT rights, with initiatives such as the display of the rainbow symbol in public events and the adoption of policies to combat discrimination. However, this agenda has been perceived as excessive by a part of the population, especially in countries with more conservative traditions, such as Poland and Hungary. Tensions have exploded when the EU has tried to counter anti-LGBT laws, such as the 2021 Hungarian law that limited “homosexual propaganda” in schools. The EU has launched infringement procedures against Budapest, but this has fueled anti-European sentiment, with Viktor Orbán’s government accusing Brussels of imposing values ​​alien to national culture.
• Insect flours and cultural resistance: In 2023, the EU authorised the use of insect flours in food, promoting them as a sustainable alternative to traditional proteins. Although the initiative was motivated by environmental objectives, it has sparked strong cultural opposition. Many European citizens, especially in countries with a strong culinary tradition such as Italy and France, perceived this move as an elitist imposition and an attack on their eating habits, contributing to a sense of alienation.
• Migrant management and social crisis: The management of migration flows has been another point of strong tension. The EU has continued to promote reception policies, but has failed to reform the asylum and migration system. Countries of first entry, such as Italy and Greece, have borne a disproportionate burden, with overcrowded reception centres and often inhumane conditions. The lack of a common policy has fuelled resentment towards migrants, with a rise in hate crimes and anti-immigration protests across Europe. In Italy, sea arrivals are expected to increase by 50% between 2022 and 2024, leading to social tensions in local communities.

Deterioration of International Relations

The EU’s choices have not only damaged its economy and internal social cohesion, but have also compromised its international relations, isolating it on several fronts.

1. Brexit and von der Leyen’s Failure to Listen

The EU’s economic, social and diplomatic crises created the ideal conditions for Brexit, culminating in the UK’s exit from the European Union on 31 January 2020, followed by the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020. The 2016 referendum, which saw 51.9% of Britons vote “Leave”, was the result of growing discontent with Brussels, fuelled by years of policies perceived as distant from citizens’ needs. The centralised and often inefficient management of crises, such as the 2015 migration crisis, reinforced the image of an EU incapable of addressing real problems: the UK, which already had a conflictual relationship with immigration (with the peak in arrivals in 2015 that had fuelled the anti-EU discourse of Nigel Farage and UKIP), saw these policies as an erosion of its sovereignty. The EU’s stringent economic regulations, such as the Green Deal and budget rules, were perceived as holding back British economic growth, especially for small businesses and the fishing sector, which played a key role in the Brexit campaign. Social polarisation, such as that generated by rainbow policies and cultural clashes, further fuelled anti-European sentiment, with many Britons seeing the EU as an elitist entity that imposed values ​​and regulations alien to their national identity. However, under President Ursula von der Leyen, rather than listening to British discontent and drawing lessons from Brexit to reform the EU, the approach was to accelerate the same divisive policies that had pushed the UK out. Von der Leyen continued to push an ideological agenda, such as the Green Deal and rainbow policies, without addressing the concerns of European citizens on issues such as immigration and cultural identity. This attitude has fueled similar discontent in other countries, such as Italy, France and Hungary, where populist and anti-European movements have gained ground, further threatening the cohesion of the EU. Furthermore, the EU’s management of Brexit has been marked by significant problems that have damaged its credibility: the negotiations, conducted with a rigid and punitive attitude, have led to ongoing tensions, such as those over the Northern Ireland Protocol, which has created friction between the UK and the EU for years, with trade disputes and threats of suspension of the agreement by London. The EU has also failed to ensure a smooth transition for European companies that depended on the British market, causing economic losses estimated at 100 billion euros per year for the EU, according to a 2023 report by the European Commission. Brexit, in this context, was not only a consequence of internal dynamics in the United Kingdom, but also the result of an EU that, under von der Leyen, ignored the signs of discontent, pushing on the accelerator of divisive policies and ineffectively managing the exit process, with repercussions that continue to undermine the stability of the Union.

2. Management of the Ukraine Crisis and Lack of Diplomacy
The EU has adopted a militarized approach in the Ukrainian crisis, neglecting diplomacy. This has had consequences on international relations:

• Marginalization in negotiations: The EU has been excluded from major negotiations between the United States and Russia, such as those in Riyadh in 2025, demonstrating its diplomatic irrelevance.
  Tensions with non-aligned countries: The EU’s insistence on asking countries of the Global South (such as India, Brazil and South Africa) to adhere to sanctions against Russia has created friction, pushing these countries to strengthen ties with Moscow and Beijing.
• Loss of credibility as a mediator: The EU, which historically presented itself as a peacekeeping force, has lost international credibility, appearing as an actor subordinate to NATO and unable to propose autonomous solutions.

3. Relations with China: The EU has adopted an ambivalent approach towards China, simultaneously defining it as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. However, some decisions have worsened relations:

• Human rights sanctions: In 2021, the EU imposed sanctions on Chinese officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, prompting a retaliation from Beijing and the freezing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI).
  Technological dependence: The EU has failed to reduce its dependence on China for critical raw materials (such as rare earths) and green technologies, leaving it vulnerable to economic pressure.
• Trade isolation: China has strengthened ties with other global partners, such as the BRICS countries, while the EU has lost ground as an influential trade player.

4. The Hostile Approach Towards Trump: A Strategic Mistake The EU’s attitude towards Donald Trump, both during his first presidency and on the eve of his re-election in 2024, has played a crucial role in the deterioration of transatlantic relations and the worsening of Europe’s global standing.

During Trump’s First Presidency (2017-2021): Since Trump’s election in 2016, European leaders have adopted a hostile and contemptuous tone, considering him a populist outsider and a danger to democratic values. This approach has had negative consequences:

• Trade war: Trump imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum, accusing the EU of unfair trade practices. The EU responded with countermeasures, but the trade war has damaged European exports, particularly in the German automotive sector.
• NATO tensions: Trump has harshly criticized European countries for failing to meet the 2% GDP defense spending target, calling NATO “obsolete.” Instead of seeking dialogue, the EU has reacted with distrust, fueling transatlantic tensions.
  Lack of cooperation on global issues: Hostility towards Trump has prevented effective collaboration on issues such as climate change (after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement) and the management of China, where a common front could have been more effective.

On the Eve of Trump’s Second Election (2024): With Trump up for re-election in 2024, the EU has continued to show a hostile attitude, failing to learn from the mistakes of the past:

• Public criticism: European leaders, such as Ursula von der Leyen, have expressed concern about a possible Trump comeback, calling his policies “a threat to democracy” and the international order. This has angered Trump’s electorate and made post-election dialogue more difficult.
• Lack of preparation: The EU has not developed a plan to deal with a second Trump term, despite signs that he may return. This has left Europe unprepared for new trade wars or a further US disengagement from NATO.
• Transatlantic isolation: Hostility towards Trump has alienated a significant part of the American establishment, pushing the US to seek other strategic partners, such as the post-Brexit UK or the Indo-Pacific countries, to the detriment of the EU.

5. Rest of the world: The EU’s hostile and judgmental attitude towards leaders of allies or potential partners has led to a progressive distancing of nations that were once close to Europe, further isolating it on the international stage.

Turkey and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Turkey, a strategic partner of the EU due to its geographical position and role in managing migration flows, has distanced itself in recent years due to the EU’s constant criticism of Erdoğan’s government. Accusations of authoritarianism, sanctions for human rights violations and tensions over drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean have pushed Ankara to seek new allies, such as Russia and China. The EU has ignored Turkey’s crucial role in NATO and in managing the migration crisis, preferring a moralistic approach that has alienated a key partner. In March 2025, Turkey intensified its relations with the BRICS countries, actively participating in the bloc’s summits and reducing cooperation with Brussels.
Arab Countries: Arab countries, especially Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have distanced themselves from the EU because of its insistence on issues such as human rights and the green transition. The EU has harshly criticized the leaders of these countries for their domestic policies, without considering their importance as energy suppliers and trade partners. This has pushed Gulf countries to strengthen ties with China and Russia, which offer economic cooperation without moral conditions. For example, Saudi Arabia has increased Chinese investment in the Belt and Road Initiative, while the EU has lost influence in the region, as demonstrated by its exclusion from the Middle East peace negotiations in 2024.
Asian Countries: The EU has taken an ambivalent approach towards Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, asking them to align with sanctions against Russia and criticizing their domestic policies. India, for example, has faced criticism for its citizenship laws and treatment of minorities, prompting New Delhi to strengthen ties with the United States and Russia, rather than Europe. Indonesia, a key trading partner, has reacted negatively to European regulations on palm oil, perceived as protectionist, and has sought alternative markets in China and Japan. This detachment has left the EU without strategic allies in a region crucial to global trade.
South America and Leaders like Milei and Maduro: In South America, the EU has alienated leaders on both the right and left with its judgmental stance. Javier Milei, Argentina’s president since 2023, has been criticized by the EU for his libertarian economic policies and skepticism of international institutions, prompting him to seek a closer alliance with Trump’s United States, which shares his anti-establishment views. Similarly, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela has been subject to sanctions and condemnations from the EU for human rights violations, but this has only strengthened Caracas’s ties with Russia, China and Iran, further isolating Europe from the region. Countries like Brazil, under Lula, have preferred to engage with the BRICS rather than with an EU perceived as arrogant and moralistic.
Eastern Europe and Viktor Orbán: Even within Europe, leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary have distanced themselves from the EU, opposing its policies on immigration, LGBT rights and the green transition. The EU has responded with infringement procedures and threats to suspend European funds, but this has only strengthened anti-European sentiment in Hungary, pushing Orbán to seek alternative allies, such as China and Turkey. This internal detachment has further weakened the cohesion of the EU, making it more vulnerable globally.

An Isolated and Decreasing Europe

The EU’s economic, social and diplomatic decisions, combined with its hostile approach to Trump, have led to economic collapse, social polarization and international isolation:

Economic decline: The combination of the post-COVID crisis, deindustrialization and inflation has weakened the European economy, with stagnant GDP growth (around 1% per year between 2022 and 2024, according to International Monetary Fund estimates). Inflation, a phenomenon unprecedented with the euro, has reached dangerous levels, eroding purchasing power and fueling social instability.
Social polarization: The EU’s social policies, such as the exaltation of the rainbow, the introduction of insect flours and the chaotic management of migrants, have generated aversion and division, strengthening populist and anti-European movements. The perception of an elitist Europe, distant from the needs of its citizens, has taken root, fueling protests and distrust.
Loss of global influence: The EU has become a marginal player on the international scene, unable to mediate conflicts and compete with powers such as the United States and China.
Transatlantic tensions: Hostility towards Trump has undermined the relationship with the United States, a historic ally, precisely at a time when Europe needed a united front to address global challenges.

A Missed Opportunity
Conclusions highlights how EU decisions contributed to economic collapse, social polarisation and deterioration of international relations, creating the conditions for Brexit and fuelling wider discontent in Europe. The poorly managed green transition, chaotic management of COVID-19, runaway inflation, divisive social policies and the lack of a post-pandemic strategy have had devastating consequences, while the hostile approach to Trump has isolated Europe from a crucial partner. Under President Ursula von der Leyen, the EU has failed to learn the lessons of Brexit, continuing to pursue policies that have exacerbated citizens’ discontent and managing the UK’s exit process rigidly and ineffectively. Before the von der Leyen era, the EU was struggling with deflation, a problem that, while complex, had never reached the emergency levels of the current inflationary and social crisis. The European Union could have adopted a more pragmatic and dialoguing attitude, both with Trump and with its own citizens, to mitigate these crises and preserve its unity. Instead, it has chosen an ideological and conflictual line, paying a high price in terms of economic stability, social cohesion and international influence.

Chapter 3: The Von der Leyen/Draghi management of the Ukraine crisis

In 2022, the Ukraine/Russia crisis reaches its highest point and the European Union (EU) for the first time in its history, has completely put aside any diplomatic initiative that would place it above the parties in a conflict that seemed more like a family matter between populations that do not even share the alphabet with Europe.
Not only that, the very harsh offensive statements against Putin immediately pronounced by Draghi and subsequently by the other European leaders, created a condition such that there was no going back. Thus, all bridges were cut towards a possible attempt at TENURE and a return to dialogue, as well as towards the possibility of seeing Europe in the position of a useful mediator as has always occurred in the past.

Dragged by Draghi, Europe thus assumed a role that could be defined as “sheriff” characterized by the immediate and without trial condemnation of one of the parties, which prejudicially takes into consideration a single fact within a series of events that have lasted for years and years and on the basis of that fact, without even listening to whether the accused has anything to say in his defense, it decides guilty and proceeds to carry out the sentence.

In this way, not only are the basic concepts of justice and protection of the accused put aside but, equally seriously, Europe with the sheriff method is completely putting aside the United Nations and its role as competent judge in international disputes.

Following the EU’s decision to sentence only the Russians as guilty – according to criteria diametrically opposed to those adopted by the USA itself when Belgrade refused to grant independence to Kosovo – the European Union has undertaken, on its own initiative, several actions in response to the Ukrainian crisis, never shared by the United Nations and by any country other than Canada.

However, the EU’s choices have not had significant negative consequences for Russia but have had them well beyond the expectations for Europe, often aggravated by a lack of diplomatic initiative and the presumption of superior and more just consequences of other countries that instead have not shared the reasons for the sanctions and, not only have not applied any sanctions, but have helped to circumvent them by making themselves available to triangulations that have determined colossal gains to the detriment of the European Union. Add to this scenario a response to every change in events characterized by the hysteria of responding immediately and therefore totally devoid of lucidity, cold blood, strategic capacity and the ability to read the future of one’s actions, and we obtain the result diametrically opposed to what Europe had set itself.

What the EU has done, and what are the critical aspects.

• The EU responded to the 2022 Russian invasion with unprecedented sanctions packages targeting Russian individuals, entities and economic sectors, such as an oil embargo (with exceptions for some countries dependent on pipelines). These measures were aimed at weakening the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war.
• The EU provided military, humanitarian and economic assistance to Kiev, including €18 million in aid in 2023 and support for the reception of millions of Ukrainian refugees (around 7 million crossed Europe’s borders by 2022). It also activated the Temporary Protection Regime for Refugees.
• Reducing energy dependence on Russia: European leaders agreed to phase out imports of Russian fossil fuels, a move accelerated by Moscow’s suspension of gas supplies to several member states.
• Candidate status for Ukraine: In June 2022, the EU granted Ukraine candidate status, opening the prospect of future membership.

The EU’s decisions, while showing solidarity with Ukraine, have had negative effects on several fronts:

• Economic and energy crisis: Sanctions against Russia and the reduction of gas imports have predictably caused energy prices in Europe to skyrocket. This has hit European citizens hard, but also industry and exports, increasing fossil fuel costs and impacting inflation. Furthermore, energy dependence has not been quickly replaced with sustainable alternatives, leaving the EU vulnerable.
• Impact on industry and food security: The war has disrupted exports of cereals and fertilizers from Ukraine and Russia, two of the world’s main suppliers. This has led to rising food prices and a supply crisis, with particularly severe repercussions for emerging countries, but also for Europe itself, which is at risk of deindustrialisation in sectors dependent on raw materials.
• Management of refugees: Although the EU has welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees, managing the influx has put pressure on neighbouring countries, such as Poland and Romania, highlighting the lack of a solid common migration policy. The process of reforming the asylum and migration system, which began in 2020, remains unfinished.
• Erosion of internal cohesion: The war has been a “third asymmetric shock” for the EU (after the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic), affecting Member States unequally. Eastern countries, more dependent on Russian gas and more exposed to the arrival of refugees, have been hit harder, fuelling internal tensions and difficulties in maintaining a fair single market.

Lack of diplomacy and exaggerated fear

The EU’s approach to the Ukrainian crisis has been characterised by a surprising lack of diplomatic initiative, often justified by exaggerated fears:

• Lack of a negotiating role: The EU has failed to present itself as an authoritative mediator in the conflict. Instead of promoting a negotiated solution, it has chosen to supply weapons to Ukraine, effectively entering into a proxy war logic. This has contradicted the ideal of Europe as a force for peace. Diplomacy has been “muzzled”, with an almost exclusive focus on the military option, as evidenced by the absence of concrete proposals for a ceasefire or dialogue between the parties.
• Fear of nuclear escalation: The EU and its member states have hesitated to supply Ukraine with modern weapons in sufficient quantities, fearing a disproportionate reaction from Moscow, including the possibility (considered unlikely by many analysts) of a recourse to nuclear weapons. For example, the 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive could have been more effective if the EU had not skimped on the most advanced weapons systems, such as the Patriot missiles, whose delivery has long been delayed for fear of “irritating Putin”.
• Exclusion from negotiations: The EU’s diplomatic passivity culminated in its exclusion from direct US-Russia negotiations in 2025, such as those held in Riyadh. This highlighted the marginality of the EU, which, despite having invested hundreds of billions in aid to Kiev, was not considered a relevant player in the ceasefire negotiations.

The EU’s lack of diplomacy is not only the result of exaggerated fear, but also of a strategic dependence on the US and NATO. The EU has slavishly followed the US line, renouncing an autonomous mediation role that could have mitigated the conflict.

The dominant narrative, which portrays the war as a struggle between an aggressor (Russia) and an aggressed (Ukraine), has oversimplified the issue, ignoring historical and geopolitical complexities, such as Russia’s fear of NATO expansion to the East, a point of tension that dates back at least to 2008, when Ukraine sought to join the Alliance.

Furthermore, the EU has failed to capitalise its history of promoting peace. In the past, it has managed complex crises (such as in the Balkans) with a combination of diplomacy and intervention, but in Ukraine it has abdicated this role, allowing the conflict to devolve into a war of attrition. The fear of a nuclear escalation or a Russian collapse, while understandable, appears disproportionate to Moscow’s real capabilities and has prevented the EU from exploring alternative avenues, such as a negotiation that would include guarantees of neutrality for Ukraine, an option that could have prevented further destruction.

Conclusion

The EU has shown solidarity with Ukraine, but its choices have had negative consequences, such as the energy crisis, the increase in food prices and the erosion of internal cohesion. The total lack of diplomacy, replaced by a militarized approach, has been aggravated by the absolute and indisputable presumption of considering themselves superior culturally and militarily.

This has relegated the EU to a marginal role, unable to influence the outcome of the conflict and to propose an alternative vision for peace in Europe. A more diplomatic Europe, capable of cushioning extreme events through dialogue, could have, and should have, done more to prevent the Ukrainian crisis from becoming the humanitarian and geopolitical disaster it is today

Chapter 4: Short and Medium Term Outlook

An Increasingly Isolated Europe

The European Union finds itself in a position of growing international isolation, a process accelerated by political and diplomatic choices that have alienated historical partners and potential allies. As already highlighted in Chapter 2, the management of the Ukrainian crisis has played a central role in this dynamic: the EU has adopted a militarized approach, neglecting diplomacy, with significant consequences on its international relations. Marginalization in negotiations, such as those in Riyadh in 2025 between the United States and Russia, has demonstrated Europe’s diplomatic irrelevance, while the insistence on asking countries of the Global South (such as India, Brazil and South Africa) to adhere to sanctions against Russia has created friction, pushing these countries to strengthen ties with Moscow and Beijing. Furthermore, the EU, which had historically proposed itself as a force for peace, has lost international credibility, appearing as an actor subordinate to NATO and unable to propose autonomous solutions. This chapter explores the short- and medium-term outlook, analyzing how the EU’s self-isolation, the narrative on the Ukrainian crisis, a massive rearmament and economic dynamics could shape the future of Europe, with consequences that could favor the interests of external powers, in particular the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump.

1. The EU’s Self-Isolation: The Detachment of Allied Countries
As we have seen previously and in greater detail, the EU’s hostile and judgmental attitude towards the leaders of allied or potential partner countries has led to a progressive detachment of nations that were once close to Europe, further isolating it on the international stage. The EU’s presumptuous attitude, which has positioned itself as the moral judge of heads of state, has led to unprecedented self-isolation. Instead of building bridges with these countries, Europe has chosen to criticize and in some cases sanction, pushing its allies towards other global powers and leaving itself alone in an increasingly multipolar world. The empirical demonstration of this isolation has been recorded with greater evidence in the different and repeated phases in which sanctions were implemented against Russia, even at the expense of its own economy. Europe, with the exception of the USA, Canada and Australia, has practically found itself isolated in turn, because its strategy has not received the global support it expected. Many countries, especially outside the West, have not adhered to the sanctions, highlighting the lack of international consensus and leaving Europe in a position of diplomatic isolation. Many key countries in the rest of the world – such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa and much of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America – have not adhered to the sanctions. These countries, which represent a significant portion of the global population and economy, have chosen not to align themselves with the European position, continuing to do business with Russia, such as India and China who have increased imports of Russian oil at discounted prices, taking advantage of the fact that Europe has reduced its purchases. Even more particular is the position of Turkey which, despite being a member of NATO, has maintained economic relations with Russia, often acting as an intermediary for trade. This widespread refusal to follow the sanctions has shown how Europe has failed to build a global coalition against Russia, remaining isolated in its economic crusade. Not only that, such a situation of isolation is at the root of the so-called “triangulation” phenomenon. Triangulation refers to commercial practices in which third countries act as intermediaries to circumvent sanctions. In other words, Russia, unable to trade directly with Europe due to sanctions, has found ways to export its products (such as oil, gas or metals) through other countries that have not adhered to the restrictions. These countries buy from Russia and then resell to Europe or other markets, often at increased prices, making money on it. This easily predictable and historically ever-present phenomenon has not only undermined the sanctions, but has further impoverished Europe and enriched those who have profited from them, “profiting” on what Europe intended as an action of “indirect discouragement” – that is, a way to isolate Russia and dissuade others from doing business with it. The effect was the opposite: triangulations allowed Russia to continue exporting, and third countries gained significant margins from these operations, to the point that the impression that the prolongation of the war between Russia and Ukraine was tacitly supported by many is not entirely unlikely.

It is clear that Europe has deluded itself into thinking it could lead a global response against Russia, but has instead revealed its geopolitical weakness. Europe’s isolation is not only diplomatic, but also practical: its sanctions have been circumvented, and other countries have taken advantage of this to profit, further weakening Europe’s position. This ties into the broader theme of the text: Europe, with its ideological narrative and its inability to mediate, has found itself excluded not only from peace negotiations, but also from the global economic game, becoming a pawn in a system it does not control.

2. The Ukraine Narrative: From Hope to Paranoia
The EU’s handling of the Ukrainian crisis has had a profound impact not only on international relations, but also on the internal perception of European citizens, shaping a narrative that has shifted from hope to fear.
The Belief of a Ukrainian Victory: At the beginning of the conflict in 2022, the EU and its leaders, under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, fueled the belief that Ukraine could win the war against Russia. This narrative was supported by a massive media and political campaign, which portrayed Ukraine as a bastion of democracy against Russian authoritarianism. European citizens were encouraged to believe that, with the military and financial support of the West, Ukraine could repel the invasion and even reconquer occupied territories, such as Crimea and Donbass. However, this vision has proven unrealistic: despite billions in aid (the EU has allocated over €100 billion in military and humanitarian aid by 2024), Ukraine has failed to secure a decisive victory, and the conflict has turned into a war of attrition, with devastating losses for both sides.
The Paranoia of an Imminent Russian Attack: As the conflict dragged on and Ukraine failed to prevail, the narrative has changed dramatically, turning into a widespread paranoia of an imminent Russian attack on Europe. However, concrete signs of Russian military expansion beyond Ukraine are weak and fragmentary. Aggressive statements by some Russian officials, often amplified by Western media, have not been accompanied by significant troop movements on NATO’s borders, and espionage or disinformation activities attributed to Moscow do not differ substantially from those of recent decades. However, since 2024, European leaders and the media have fueled a climate of fear, presenting Russia as an existential threat to the whole of Europe. This paranoia is, in reality, the perhaps unintended result of a massive propaganda campaign launched in 2022, which has portrayed Ukraine not only as a victim of Russian aggression, but as the bulwark defending the whole of Europe from an imminent invasion. This narrative, initially designed to justify military and financial support for Kiev, has had the collateral effect of instilling a sense of constant danger in European citizens, amplified by the growing Russian military presence on the eastern borders and the alarmist rhetoric of countries such as Poland and the Baltic states. The governments of these countries, fearing that they will be the next targets, have increased military spending and called for a greater deployment of NATO troops, further fueling the climate of anxiety among the European population.

European Troops in Ukraine and American Interests: The consequence of this paranoia will be, in the short term, the deployment of European troops in Ukraine, justified as a measure to “ensure the security” of the region. By 2026, the EU, under pressure from NATO and the United States, is likely to send military contingents to stabilize the Ukrainian-Russian border, presenting this move as an act of defense of democratic values. However, this military presence will have a second, less declared purpose: to guarantee the United States, under the presidency of Donald Trump, secure access to Ukrainian natural resources, especially rare earths, of which Ukraine is rich (the country has about 5% of the world’s reserves of lithium and graphite, essential for green technologies). European troops will, in fact, protect American economic interests, preventing Russia or the Ukrainians themselves from interfering in the extraction of these resources. This scenario marks a further loss of autonomy for the EU, which will find itself doing the “dirty work” on behalf of the United States, while Trump will be able to focus on his economic goals without risking direct involvement of his forces.

3. The Monstrous Rearmament of Europe and the Rise of the Right
Another significant development in the medium term will be the massive rearmament of Europe, a process that will intensify in the coming years and that will culminate with the rise to power of the right, finding full arsenals ready for use.
An Unprecedented Rearmament: The fear of a Russian attack, combined with the growing global instability and the isolation of the EU, will push European countries to drastically increase military spending in the coming years. According to projections by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), EU military spending could reach €500 billion annually by 2030, a 50% increase from 2024 levels. Countries such as Germany, France and Poland are already investing in new weapons: Germany has announced a special €100 billion defence fund in 2022, while Poland has ordered hundreds of tanks and missile systems from the United States. The EU itself is developing joint projects, such as the European Defence Fund, to boost its military industry and reduce dependence on American weapons. This rearmament will not only be a response to the Russian threat, but also an attempt to reassert Europe’s relevance in an increasingly militarised world.

The Arsenal will be Readys for the Rise of the Nationalist Party: The Fruit of Von Der Leyen’s Fear. In parallel with the European rearmament, the nationalist right is gaining ground across the continent, a rise that finds its roots in the wicked fear instilled by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and transmitted with persuasion to the population. Von der Leyen, with her alarmist rhetoric about Russia as an existential threat, has fueled a climate of paranoia that has justified the rearmament and the race for a European army, turning Europe into a continent on the brink of panic.

This terror, amplified by the media and an obsessive Ukrainian narrative, has done the rest, creating the perfect breeding ground for the right. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy has governed since 2022, promoting a hard line on security and borders; In France, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National is the favorite for the 2027 elections, with a program of “national sovereignty” against Brussels. In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) reached 20% in the 2025 polls, exploiting fears of the energy crisis and immigration, while in Hungary Viktor Orbán consolidates his power, opposing any European interference. By 2030, it is plausible that the right will come to government in at least 13 countries, including Poland, Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands, where parties such as PiS, the Swedish Democrats, the Freedom Party and Geert Wilders’ PVV are already capitalizing on discontent.
If this happens, they will find full arsenals, thanks to the rearmament wanted by von der Leyen and her allies, a legacy that risks turning into a double-edged sword.
Imagine a Europe in 2030: in Poland, PiS exerts military pressure on neighbors like Lithuania; in Hungary, Orbán organizes exercises on the Ukrainian border for propaganda purposes. In Germany, a ruling AfD could push for expansionist policies in Eastern Europe, using fear of Russia – the same fear sown by von der Leyen – as an excuse. Every border area would become a hotbed of tension: in Italy, Trentino-Alto Adige could see clashes between South Tyrolean autonomist movements, backed by Austria, and a central government that uses force to repress any separatist ambitions; the Aosta Valley, with its independence drives, could become the scene of armed protests against an increasingly nationalist Italy. In Spain, Catalonia could explode into civil conflict again, with a right-wing government in Madrid deploying the army to crush any attempts at secession. In the UK, Northern Ireland risks descending into a new civil war, with post-Brexit tensions between unionists and republicans turning into open clashes, while a right-wing British government uses weapons to “maintain unity”. In the Balkans, Serbia could use its arsenals to stoke tensions in Kosovo or Bosnia, where ethnic divisions remain a powder keg.
With arsenals in the hands of nationalist forces, Europe risks becoming a patchwork of armed states, ready to clash with each other and could use weapons to resolve old territorial issues – such as Poland reclaiming Kaliningrad or Hungary eyeing territories lost under the Treaty of Trianon – or to expand in search of riches, such as access to the resources of the Baltic or the Black Sea, in a desperate attempt to revive national economies strangled by the crisis into which Europe will inevitably plunge.
Brussels, emptied of authority, would helplessly witness the collapse of the European project, a disaster that bears the hallmark of von der Leyen’s wicked vision.

4. Not Just Isolated, Also Subordinate and Marginal

The EU’s political, diplomatic and economic decisions are shaping a future in which Europe risks becoming an increasingly marginal player on the global stage:
Economic Decline and Trade Marginalization: Europe will find itself increasingly marginalized economically in the coming years, due to the continuation of sanctions against Russia, US-imposed tariffs and existing tariffs against China. Sanctions against Russia, which began in 2014 and intensified in 2022, have cut the EU off from a crucial market for energy and raw materials, pushing Moscow to reorient its exports towards China, India and other Asian countries. This has left Europe in a vulnerable position on energy, with rising costs hurting its industries, already weakened by the deindustrialization described in Chapter 2. At the same time, tariffs imposed by the United States under President Trump, such as those on steel and aluminum, and European countermeasures have reduced the EU’s access to the American market, while pre-existing tariffs on China, such as those on technology products, have limited the competitiveness of European companies in Asia. This has facilitated the acquisition by the United States of market shares previously occupied by Russia, particularly in the energy sector: the US has increased exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe, replacing Russian gas and consolidating its dominant position. By 2027, the United States is likely to control more than 50% of the European gas market, according to projections by the International Energy Agency (IEA), while Europe, cut off from its traditional trading partners, will see its economy grow at a stagnant pace, with GDP expected to increase by just 0.8% annually between 2025 and 2030.
Diplomatic Isolation: Self-isolation caused by hostility towards leaders such as Erdoğan, Orbán, Milei and Maduro has left Europe alone in a multipolar world, pushing its allies towards rival powers such as China and Russia.
Strategic Subordination: The narrative on the Ukrainian crisis, which has shifted from hope of victory to paranoia of a Russian attack, will lead to the deployment of European troops in Ukraine, a move that, under the justification of security, will favor Trump’s US economic interests in rare earth mining.
Internal Instability: Europe’s massive rearmament, combined with the rise of the right, will create a continent armed to the teeth, ready to be exploited by nationalist political forces that could threaten internal and external stability.

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